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Not ‘human’ enough to be human but not ‘animal’ enough to be animal – the case of the 
HFEA, cybrids and xenotransplantation in the UK 
 
Gill Haddow∗, Ann Bruce,♣ Jane Calvert,♥ Shawn H.E. Harmon,♠ Wendy Marsden♦ 
 
 
Abstract: Innovations in scientific and medical technologies, such as 
xenotransplantation and admixed embryos, invariably become the target of 
regulatory agencies and often demand new regulatory frameworks. In making 
decisions associated with these innovations, it is sometimes necessary for 
regulators to adopt certain positions about the status and significance of the 
human-animal embryo or body. In the UK, the regulatory and advisory bodies 
involved in the sphere of human/non-human transfer and exchange of material 
are: (1) The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA); (2) the 
(defunct) UK Xenotransplantation Interm Regulatory Authority and (3) the 
Home Office’s Animal Procedures Committee (APC). In this article, we 
critically examine the reasons for the HFEA’s involvement in regulating and 
advising in research which uses admixed embryos, given that the HFEA’s 
remit is the government’s fertility watchdog regulating in the area of human 
embryos. This expansion, we argue, was partly due to pressure from pro- 
cybrid supporters and the need to fill an institutional void left by the 
decommissioning of UKXIRA. Ironically, specific institutions such as 
UKXIRA may have been better placed to deal with animal-human fusions. 
 
Keywords: xenotransplantation; admixed embryos; regulation, and identity.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The fascination with crossing the human/animal species barrier has a long history. For example, 
in ancient Egyptian, Greek and Roman myth and iconography, sphinxes (human-lion 
combinations), centaurs (human-horse combinations), fauns (human-goat combinations) and 
minotaurs (human-bull combinations) featured heavily. Although the stark physical combinations 
envisioned by our forebears has not been realised, researchers have not baulked at the 
possibilities offered by the biological similarities between humans and animals in the 
understanding of disease and the development of therapies. Technologies have been developed 
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which can facilitate the transfer of DNA, cells, tissue and organs from humans to animals, and 
vice versa. Indeed, a multitude of human-animal variations can be created depending on the 
nature of the entity envisioned, the specific animal used, the nature and amount of biological 
material inserted, and the stage of existence or development being addressed. In recent years, two 
procedures in particular have gained scientific and regulatory attention in the UK: (1) 
‘xenotransplantation’, which describes the transplantation of tissue or organs from one species to 
another (Deschamps, Roux, Sai, & Gouin, 2005); and (2) ‘cybridisation’, which is implantation 
of a human cell nucleus into an enucleated animal egg (usually a cow or rabbit). The former 
exemplifies the introduction of animal material into a human body; the latter human material into 
an animal cell. 
Importantly, both xenotransplantation and cybrid research are controversial examples of 
emerging and evolving biotechnologies that raise complex issues relating to (1) the status of the 
human body (i.e. what is human about the human form), and (2) the nature of human identity (i.e. 
how does such intermingling effect our sense of humanness and our identification and interaction 
with other entities). Cybrids and xenotransplantation were both created due to shortages in 
human embryonic or organ material and share a similar purpose of offering therapeutic solutions 
to human morbidity. These technologies sit on opposite ends of the animal-human admixture 
spectrum insofar as xenotransplantation is an ‘old’ technique which focuses primarily on whole 
organs placed into human bodies, and cybrids is a ‘new’ procedure at the molecular level. Both 
of these biotechnologies depend, to some extent, on the continuity in biology between human and 
non-human animals (so that scientifically generated entities might provide new treatments or 
cures) despite the fact that UK regulation (as we shall see) focuses on the differences between 
them. Both rely on an ethic of acceptability of using animal bodies to further human interests. 
And, finally, both xenotransplantation and cybrid research evoke mythological imagery such as 
the Greek minotaur or social commentary such as HG Wells’ Island of Doctor Moreau, and 
therefore sit at the interface of science fact and science fiction, making them particularly 
vulnerable to hyperbole within scientific, regulatory, media and public domains. 
It is perhaps trite to say that interspecies transplantation (regardless of the direction) 
poses political, social, and moral challenges to our regulatory system, which in the UK has 
evolved in a manner that treats animals and humans quite separately. Regulatory decisions 
concerning hybrid forms (i.e.: concerning innovations in the transfer of DNA, cells, tissue and 
organs between humans and animals) can have profound epistemic and social implications 
insofar as they challenge our commonly held conceptions about what is human and what is 
animal. This is amply evidenced by the heated discussions which took place in 2008 around 
proposed amendments to the Human Fertilisation and Embryo Act 1990 (HFEA 1990) which 
was to allow the mixing of human and animal material at the embryonic level. While there have 
been efforts to examine various aspects of law and governance relating to the research and use of 
xenotransplantation and, to a lesser extent, admixed embryos (Brown et al. 2006; Brown and 
Michael 2004), there has been much less thought given to which of the competing regulatory 
institutions in the UK most appropriately takes the lead in decision-making in the human-animal 
setting. In this article, we critically examine how regulatory institutions in the UK respond to the 
challenges to human identity posed by xenotransplantation and cybridisation. First, we briefly 
discuss theoretical and epistemological writing in the area.  Then we consider the scientific 
possibilities that characterise this field. Third, we highlight the short regulatory history of these 
two practices reviewing 1) The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA); (2) the 
(defunct) UK Xenotransplantation Interm Regulatory Authority and (3) the Home Office’s 
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Animal Procedures Committee (APC). Finally, we suggest that a regulatory void was 
inadvertently created with the deregulation of UKXIRA (a process singularly interesting purely 
for its rare occurrence). This void was made visible by the emergence of novel entities such as 
admixed embryos hence the HFEA’s remit as the government’s fertility and embryology 
authority regulating in the area of human embryos had to be extended to regulate the area of 
admixed embryos. How this was accomplished illustrates a tension between the need for 
regulation and the classification of species in genetic terms. 
 
I. REGULATING THE BODY 
 
Whereas xenotransplantation arguably constitutes a barrier threat to human identity in terms of 
the transplantation of an animal organ into a human; cybrids pose a creation threat insofar as a 
distinction had to be drawn between what is human and what is animal. In the case of the ‘old’ 
xenotransplantation technology the scientific object (e.g. the transgenic pig) was defined 
formally by those charged with governing use, rather than the scientists involved in the mixing of 
human and animal cells (Brown, Faulkner, Kent, & Michael, 2006). As will be discussed, the 
case is more complex with cybrids, as regulatory institutions have had to classify these ‘newer’ 
admixed phenomena as human or animal before they can determine what kind of regulation can 
be applied to them. Scientific innovation may not assist, because previously, linguistic licence 
had been taken on whether cybrids are ‘pseudo-hybrids’, ‘admix’ ‘interspecies embryo’ or, the 
term eventually settled upon: ‘cybrids’. Concern had been expressed about the discrepancy 
between the understanding of scientists and regulators in this area (House of Commons Science 
and Technology Committee, 2007). In short, the status of the cybrid is less clear-cut to regulators 
than the component parts in the xenotransplantation context were perceived to be. Hence, 
through their decisions in areas such as xenotransplantation and cybrids, regulators and 
regulatory institutions are generating new classifications that challenge previous understandings 
of the boundaries between human and animal entities. Indeed debates around the new 
technologies often focus on ethical and governmental issues surrounding their regulation, but 
leave unexplored how ‘our attitudes towards them are linked to perennial human anxieties about 
the strange, the new, and the other’ (Jackson, 2002). From the limited research available, public 
reactions of disgust (or ‘yuk’ factor) is a description of a response to an issue, that could be seen 
as irrational, or emotional, but which highlights discourses about ‘naturalness’ (Michael and 
Brown 2004). The ‘yuk’ responses found are probably related to the fact that the process of 
interspecies mixing rarely happens in nature. Natural combinations between biological species 
are relatively rare (e.g. animal-animal combinations such as mules or hinnys). 
One of the central themes of current discourse on research that mixes human and animal 
is that of classification. In her classic text, ‘Purity and Danger’ (1966) the anthropologist Douglas 
suggests that ‘pollution behaviour is the reaction which condemns any object or idea likely to 
confuse or contradict cherished classifications’ (Douglas, 1966). Dirt, or rather uncleanness, is 
‘matter out of place’, something that may be out of synch with the supposed natural order 
therefore causing ambiguity and concern (1966: 36). Applying this analogy to 
xenotransplantation, although pigs or any other animal may not necessarily be considered 
unclean, their usage in xenotransplantation challenges known schemata of what it is to be a ‘pig’ 
and what it is to be ‘human.’ In the case of both xeno-practices and admixed embryos, such 
entities transgress familiar and taken for granted boundaries between animals and humans (Alter, 
2007; Chakrabarty, 2003; Robert & Baylis, 2003). In the case of cybrids, the regulators must 
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classify new phenomena before they can determine what kind of regulation can be applied to 
them. There is then a tension in the ordering of things (Foucault, 1966) for scientists and 
regulators as they work to construct these mixed phenomena as scientific objects that can be 
controlled, manipulated and regulated either as human or as animal. Similarily, Agamben writes 
that the entry of zoē, (the biological life of all common entities; the ‘bare life’) into the bios, the 
regulatory sphere, signals a decisive moment in the development of modernity. Where bios and 
zoē converge is a blind spot termed a ‘zone of intersection’ (Agamben, 1998). Clearly, the 
regulation of admixed embryos takes place in such a zone of intersection. However, in this area 
the ‘contrasting poles of the human and non-human remain precarious and unstable havens into 
which regulatory policy-making retreats when confronted with the monstrous’ (Brown, 2009). 
Admixed embryos lie in the zone of intersection where bios and zoē collide therein yet, as Brown 
suggests, the bios represents ‘a constitutional refortification of traditional speciesist hierarchies’ 
(Brown 2009: 162). We consider the contested and controversial efforts (and second efforts) that 
have been undertaken to govern these practices and the strategy used to demarcate the human 
and non-human in the case of cybrids.  
 
II. THE SCIENTIFIC SETTING: GENE SPLICING AND SPECIES MERGERS 
 
As one might anticipate, there is a wide range of ways in which human and non-human animals 
might be mixed by human artifice so as to produce a hybrid entity and these are defined in Table 
1. 
 
Table 1 
Non-Consumptive 
Use of Animals 
Description 
For physical properties An example would be pig heart valves used for 
transplantation to humans. Here the tissue is essentially 
‘dead’ and is used for its physical properties 
For extraction of 
useful products 
Therapeutic products for human use can be derived from 
animals e.g. pregnant mare serum gonadotrophin (PMSG) 
which is purified from the urine of pregnant mares and 
used in human medicine. Some of these may be 
replaceable using recombinant DNA technology e.g. 
insulin for treating diabetes was previously extracted from 
pigs but this source has been replaced by production of 
human insulin in genetically modified bacteria. 
For testing For example, the capacity of human sperm to fertilise an 
egg can be tested by allowing them to fertilise an animal 
egg. The law requires that the resulting ‘embryo’ is 
destroyed. Cells derived from human embryonic stem cells 
have also been tested in animals. 
For supply of donor 
eggs  
The proposed use of cow or rabbit egg as the ‘host’ for a 
human nucleus. The suggested use is for research purposes 
only 
For products derived 
from ‘humanised’ (or 
Therapeutic proteins may be produced in milk or eggs. The 
reasons given are that the normal production capacity for 
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genetically modified) 
animals 
these types of proteins (large-scale cell culture) is currently 
becoming limiting and production is expensive. The 
European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products 
(EMEA) has recently approved the first such product, a 
protein produced in goat milk by the company GTC 
Therapeutics. Protein production in eggs is still at the 
experimental level. 
For organs derived 
from ‘humanised’ (or 
genetically modified) 
animals 
This is xenotransplantation and the most likely GM animal 
source is the pig. The intention is to produce organs for 
transplant into humans in order to overcome the current 
shortage of donor organs. 
 
As indicated above, the present article is concerned with two examples from Table 1, namely 
‘use of organs from ‘humanised’ animals’ (commonly referred to as xenotransplantation), and 
‘the supply of donor eggs’ (otherwise referred to as cybridisation). Although xenotransplants 
maintain their animal cell structure, they can be transplanted into humans, thereby exploiting 
their properties as functioning organs, by being ‘disguised’ as human organs via genetic 
modification. Increasingly, the subject pigs are transgenic – bred and modified to make them 
more ‘acceptable’ to human (e.g. they are engineered so as not produce the Gal epitope). It is 
generally accepted that pigs are amenable to xeno-practices because of their fecundity, but also 
from an ethical standpoint (Brown & Michael, 2001). In 1984, a UK moratorium on human-
animal xenotransplant was called for and enforced until 1992.1 Surges of interest and activity in 
xenotransplantation occurred following immunological discoveries in the early 1990s, and 
advances in animal genetic modification in the late 1990s and early 2000s. However, as research 
has moved increasingly into the intercellular level, ‘new’ cybrid technologies have, to some 
extent, displaced ‘old’ (and unperfected) xeno-practices. Cybrids are permissible and are created 
through cell nuclear replacement, where the complete nuclear DNA from a human cell is 
transferred into an animal egg which has had its nuclear DNA removed. The potential use and 
demand for this technology has been expanded due to difficulties associated with obtaining 
human eggs and the desire to produce stem cell lines (e.g. Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer or 
cloned stem cell lines). The hope is that research using cybrids will lead to a better understanding 
of, and new treatments for, diseases such as Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, cystic fibrosis, motor 
neurone disease and Huntington’s through the creation of a supply of ‘diseased’ stem cells. 
 
III. THE REGULATORY MILIEU: THE UKXIRA, HFEA, AND APC 
 
(1) Xenotransplantation: Regulating Animal Materials into Human Being 
 
In 1995, the ‘Animal Tissue into Humans’ (1997) report concluded that xenotransplantation 
would be acceptable provided certain criteria were met, including the establishment of a 
regulatory body. The United Kingdom Xenotransplantation Interim Regulatory Authority 
(UKIXRA) was set up following the Nuffield Report (Nuffield Council of Bioethics., 1996) and 
                                                 
1  The Baby Fae case has been criticised as unethical; commentators have questioned how informed consent could 
have been realised in a xenotransplantation setting generally and in this case more specifically; they have highlighted the 
difficulty of differentiating between clinical and therapeutic trials; and used the case to push for close monitoring of 
xenotransplantation (McLean and Williamson 2005). 
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the Kennedy Report (Department of Health; The Stationery Office, 1997; Kennedy Report., 
1997), each of which examined the ethical implications of xenotransplantation. The Kennedy 
Report recommended that a national body be set up to regulate and monitor xenotransplantation. 
UKXIRA was set up in lieu of a permanent standing committee, charged with, broadly, ensuring 
that ‘animal to human transplantation … [was] …developed safely in the United Kingdom’ 
(McLean & Williamson, 2005). However, the terms of reference were advisory and not 
regulatory (Department of Health, 2008). UKIXRA remained in operation for 9 years, from 1997 
to December 2006, when it was disbanded and other organisations absorbed its functions and 
new xenotransplantation guidance was developed (DoH, 2008). The agenda and membership of 
UKXIRA appears to have declined in the years leading up to its disbandment 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/ab/Archive/UKXIRA/DH_087870. The official reasons given for its 
disbandment included an alleged lack of interest, and uncertainty around ‘zoonosis’ – the transfer 
of potentially harmful diseases such as PERVs (Porcine endogenous retroviruses) to humans 
from animals. It is suggested that cross-species infection, transmitted in vivo through a 
xenotransplant, is particularly risky, as the procedure is so novel, and risks are currently 
unknown (Herring, Cunningham, Whittam, Fernandez-Suarez, & Langford, 2001). Though 
research and funding does appear to have waned somewhat over the past few years, many 
researchers remain confident that xenotransplantation will one day be a viable alternative (Groth, 
2007). Indeed, some commentators argue that the disbanding of UKXIRA is of concern because 
xenotransplantation still offers a possible solution to the shortage of transplantable and/or 
graftable organs and tissues, and that the ethical and safety complexity of xenotransplantation 
warrants a specialist body to ensure that it does not proceed without adequate controls being in 
place (McLean and Williamson 2007). For example, before it was disbanded, UKIXRA 
expressed concern that researchers and desperate patients might be tempted to conduct 
xenotransplantation experiments overseas, in countries with less stringent regulations since 
‘countries with the most liberal xenotransplantation procedures (even if this position has been 
arrived at inadvertently) may well attract research teams or surgeons who wish to conduct 
experimental procedures that remain unacceptable in countries with tighter regulation’ (Ibid 
2007: 374). 
Such a prediction materialised last year when research into creating pigs with 
‘humanised’ organs was moved from the UK to the US after British regulations prevented 
experiments (Connor, 2007). The decision to reject the procedures in the UK was taken by the 
Home Secretary but part of the responsibility for examining applications for xenotransplantation 
trials now rests with the APC. The APC does not licence applications but reviews and then 
advises the Home Secretary on the animal welfare or ethical implications. The APC also works 
closely with the Home Office Animals Scientific Procedures Division which is responsible for 
matters relating to the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 that requires licensing of all 
scientific procedures on animals and the use of an inspectorate to ensure compliance. Like 
UKXIRA, it is an advisory, Non-Departmental Public Body. For UKXIRA the emphasis is on 
the risk xenotransplantation posed to humans as well as animal welfare (see above); for the APC, 
who continue to advise the Home Secretary, their focus in on the cost-benefit balance i.e. cost to 
animal versus benefit to human – as well as ensuring experiments are conducted appropriately 
with consideration to welfare (Animal Procedures Committee. http://www.apc.gov.uk/). The 
APC sub-committees have no specific focus on xenotransplantation or indeed their ethical or 
legal implications (http://apc.homeoffice.gov.uk/members/composition.htm). UKXIRA, on the 
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other hand commissioned ethical and legal reviews and in its nascent stage was chaired by a 
professor of law and ethics. 
Essentially, the modern history of the relationship between UKXIRA and 
xenotransplantation (perhaps more broadly of regulation and scientific innovation) points to the 
unpredictability of scientific progress and the problematic nature of regulating in uncertainty, 
alongside the deep-set ethical issues that arise from such animal-human fusion procedures 
(Bruce, 1998). Such complexity, some have argued, requires a specialist body to examine the 
social, ethical and practical implications focussing particularly on both the animal and human 
repercussions (McLean & Williamson, 2007). There is a general trend in the UK whereby the 
regulatory body often ‘fits’ the biological one (Brown & Michael, 2004). That is, a regulatory 
body whose responsibilities map on to the existence of the entity being produced (discussed 
later). The cyclical nature of innovation is a constant feature and could be recognized as such, 
regardless of the eventual promise of cure or therapy. The lessons that this behoves us to learn 
when regulating cybrids shall be addressed below.  
 
(2) Cybrid Research: Regulating human material into Animal Entities 
 
A number of admixed embryos can be created through cell nuclear replacement although they 
were originally banned under the HFEA 1990 Act. Cybrids are one example that are said to be 
99.9% human, with the animal element (0.01%) being ‘residual’ (e.g. mitochondrial DNA) 
outside the nucleus of the cell; crudely put, a human nucleus is contained within an animal shell. 
A key player in the case of cybrids is the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
(HFEA) – a statutory body, created in 1991 under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
(1990). The HFEA is the UK's independent regulator overseeing the use of gametes and embryos 
in fertility treatment and research and probably one of the first of its type in the world. HFEA 
Members are appointed by UK Health Ministers in accordance with the guidance from the 
Commissioner for Public Appointments (the ‘Nolan’ Guidelines). The HFEA has eight sub-
committees including a specialised ethical and legal advisory group. The HFEA licences centres 
carrying out In Vitro Fertilisation (IVF), other assisted conception procedures and human 
embryo research, and provides a range of detailed information for patients, professionals, the 
public and Government. (http://www.hfea.gov.uk/en/default.html Accessed 12.05.08). If it is 
accepted that an application for research falls within the HFEA’s remit, it must go to the HFEA 
Licence Committee for consideration. 
The HFEA has faced difficulties in the regulation of research, and the interpretation of 
the HFE Act 1990 has been a nexus for controversy and legal challenge (e.g. see Quintavalle v 
HFEA [2005] UKHL 28 (HL)). According to the courts, the HFEA has jurisdiction over human 
embryos, irrespective of whether such embryos are produced by fertilisation or by a process 
involving cell nuclear transfer. In November 2006 UK researchers from Newcastle University 
and King's College London applied to the HFEA for a three-year licence to create cybrids using 
human DNA with cow eggs. A month later, the government published its proposals for revision 
of the HFE Act 1990 (Cm 6989), including proposals aimed at clarifying government policy on 
the creation of human-animal hybrid and chimeric embryos. The White Paper explained that the 
Government had found that the HFE Act 1990 did not refer to more novel processes of embryo 
creation that had been developed since the Act was passed. The government proposed to clarify 
the extent to which the law applies to such entities, but also to prohibit their creation, unless 
there were circumstances in which they may be allowed under licence; a paradoxical objective of 
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prohibition but with exception. Many media sources reported this and a group of scientists wrote 
an open letter to ‘The Times’, expressing their concern with the proposed legislation arguing that 
the proposed ‘ban’ was not based on scientific judgement, but on biased public opinion (Harris 
2007). Scientists and others began to openly challenge the government’s decision and key 
protagonists of hybrid creations (mainly scientists, representatives of funding bodies, Labour 
politicians) eventually ‘won’ the (media) debate about the creation of cybrids (Williams, Gajevic, 
Lewis, & Kitzinger, 2009). In response, the UK government essentially conducted a U-turn: the 
subsequent draft bill made it clearer that the creation of some types of animal-human embryos 
could be allowed, as these were ‘necessary’ for research (Department of Health, 2007). In May 
2008 the House of Commons voted on amendments to the Human Embryology and Fertilisation 
Bill, and the amendment to ban the creation of cybrids was defeated in a free vote (336 to 176) 
(Dyer, 2008). The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill successfully passed its final 
parliamentary stage in November 2008 when the House of Lords accepted amendments to the 
Bill made in the Commons. The Bill received Royal Assent in December 2008 and is set to come 
into force in October 2009. The amendments to the HFE Act 2008 suggest that:  
 
(6) For the purposes of this Act a human admixed embryo is—  
(a) an embryo created by replacing the nucleus of an animal egg or of an animal 
cell, or two animal pronuclei, with—  
(i) two human pronuclei,  
(ii) one nucleus of a human gamete or of any other human cell, or  
(iii) one human gamete or other human cell,  
(b) any other embryo created by using—  
(i) human gametes and animal gametes, or  
(ii) one human pronucleus and one animal pronucleus,  
(c) a human embryo that has been altered by the introduction of any sequence of 
nuclear or mitochondrial DNA of an animal into one or more cells of the embryo,  
(d) a human embryo that has been altered by the introduction of one or more 
animal cells, or  
(e) any embryo not falling within paragraphs (a) to (d) which contains both nuclear 
or mitochondrial DNA of a human and nuclear or mitochondrial DNA of an animal 
(‘animal DNA’) but in which the animal DNA is not predominant. 
(http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2008/ukpga_20080022_en_2#pt1-pb1-l1g1) 
 
This is an extremely varied and broad remit that covers ‘any embryo….in which the animal DNA 
is not predominant’. Here we see a danger in using the term ‘admixed embryo’ as a catch-all for 
very different human-animal combination of which the moral implications may diverge 
significantly. The HFE Act 2008 covers all types of admixed embryos and all can be potentially 
licensed except under the following conditions: 
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(1) No person shall place in a woman—  
(a) a human admixed embryo,  
(b) any other embryo that is not a human embryo, or  
(c) any gametes other than human gametes.  
(2) No person shall—  
(a) mix human gametes with animal gametes,  
(b) bring about the creation of a human admixed embryo, or  
(c) keep or use a human admixed embryo, except in pursuance of a licence. 
(3) A licence cannot authorise keeping or using a human admixed embryo after the 
earliest of the following—  
(a) the appearance of the primitive streak, or  
(b) the end of the period of 14 days beginning with the day on which the process of 
creating the human admixed embryo began, but not counting any time during 
which the human admixed embryo is stored.  
(4) A licence cannot authorise placing a human admixed embryo in an animal.  
(5) A licence cannot authorise keeping or using a human admixed embryo in any 
circumstances in which regulations prohibit its keeping or use.  
 
The HFE Act makes it illegal to place admixed embryos in either a human or animal womb. 
Further, human embryos, including the admixed variety, are not allowed to develop beyond 14 
days, although those that are not considered human (e.g. those that are 40% human, 60% animal) 
may be allowed to develop longer. In sum, there was and continues to be an apparent lack of 
reflective, explicit and integrated regulatory approaches to admixed entities e.g. a certain level of 
ad hoc-ery is disclosed, that is catalysed by scientific innovation. Moreover, the HFEAs 
involvement in the regulation of cybrids was, arguably, forced on it in light of a desire to avoid a 
perceived gap in the regulatory system, a gap that had become obvious by the disbandment of 
UKXIRA and the creation of admixed embryos. As we shall now argue it was better to classify 
the cybrid as human so as to regulate it rather than define it as non-human and therefore 
unregulated.  
 
IV. THE PROBLEM AND THE FUTURE 
 
Not human enough to be human…the status of the embryo 
 
The reasons for the UK government turn-around from prohibitive to permissive and to allow 
admixed embryos to go ahead are enlightening when discussing issues of human identity. 
Although the decision partly stemmed from political pressure from scientific and academic 
circles and within the cabinet itself, it is arguable the u-turn could not have occurred unless the 
embryos were defined as human. The HFEA regulates and advises on all human embryo research 
yet this begs the question of whether any type of admixed embryo should fall within its auspices. 
 10 
According to the UK courts, the HFEA has jurisdiction over human embryos, irrespective of 
whether such embryos are produced by fertilisation or by a process involving cell nuclear 
transfer. However, only four kinds of embryos in the Bill are even ‘nearly human’ (above a, c, d 
and e – b refers to a hybrid with 50% human and 50% animal DNA). Such embryos raise the 
question: what is inherently unique about human life? How should we gauge humanness? In a 
report entitled Human Reproductive Technologies and the Law prepared in 2005 by the UK 
House of Commons Science and Technology Committee it was argued that ‘while there is 
revulsion in some quarters that [human-nonhuman] creations appear to blur the distinction 
between animals and humans, it could be argued that they are less human, and therefore pose 
fewer ethical problems for research than fully human embryos’ (UK House of Commons Science 
and Technology Committee., 2005)  
 
… But not animal enough to be animal. 
 
The decision of whether a human-animal chimera or a hybrid embryo would fall within the 
HFEA remit was based on a paradox – although admixed embryos are a highly differentiated mix 
of animal-human material, which are considered less human than humans, they are more human 
than other admixes such as transgenic pigs. Cybrids are said to be 99.9% human and although 
they are regarded as ‘less than human’ they can be regulated by the HFEA (O'Dowd, 2007). The 
amendment to the HFE Act suggests that it can regulate in areas where the animal DNA does not 
predominate – but this begs the question of where the cut-off point will be i.e., 51% human and 
49% animal? It is problematic to make such categorisations of species identity in terms of 
percentages because DNA does not define species; in fact species are notoriously hard to define 
in biological terms (e.g. Robert and Baylis 2003). Furthermore, there is contention surrounding 
the measurement of genetic differences between humans and animals. Although it is often stated 
that humans are 98% chimpanzee in genetic terms, an exploration of the technical literature 
behind this figure shows that matching up human and chimpanzee DNA is not a straightforward 
process (Marks 2003). When comparing human and chimpanzee DNA it is necessary to first 
identify and define the segment of DNA that is being compared. As Marks (2003) points out, this 
raises, ‘the fundamental problem of homology in biology: What is the precisely corresponding 
entity in the other species?’ (p.137). Such methods of comparison would also lead us to the 
conclusion that we share 25% of our DNA with all other existing life forms, and approximately 
35% of our DNA with daffodils (Marks, 2003). In this context, as Robert and Baylis (2003) 
argue, the question arises of whether it makes sense to talk of ‘human DNA’ at all: ‘Much of 
‘our’ DNA is shared with a huge variety of apparently distantly related creatures (e.g., yeast, 
worms, mice, etc). Indeed, given the evidence that all living things share a common ancestor, 
there is little (if any) uniquely human DNA’ (Robert & Baylis, 2003). Points such as these 
highlight the limitations of trying to reduce the differences between human and animals to 
percentages of genetic similarity, and problematise the measurements of percentages of human 
and animal DNA that we see in the regulation of cybrids. Furthermore, the decision to define 
humanness in terms of DNA percentage is contra to one of the fundamental principles for the 
HFEA’s existence regarding the regulation of embryos, which states that the early embryo has a 
‘special status’ that must be subject to stringent controls and monitoring (Warnock, 1984). This 
‘special status’ reflects the embryos irreducibility to its cellular composition and is a reflection 
that as humans, we are considerably more than a sum of our parts.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
We have not been concerned with the need for regulation, what that regulation does, nor even 
whether the HFEA is meeting this need in practical terms. Our concern is to do with the 
relationship between regulation and the classification and categorisation of human-animal identity. 
Some might argue that the status of the admixed embryos is largely academic given that, currently, 
such entities cannot be developed past the primitive streak and no scientist as yet appears to 
propose this. Further, recent reports suggest that progress has been hampered by the UK funding 
bodies refusal to fund two of the three licence holders permitted to conduct cybrid research in 
favour of iPS (induced pluripotent stem cells) (Connor, 2009). However, lessons from 
xenotransplantation and regulation strongly indicate 1) the cyclical nature of medical progress in 
this area and 2) that in the UK often the ‘regulatory’ body fits with the ‘biological’ one. In 
agreement with other authors, we suggest that regulation of animal-human entities in the UK was 
typically mapped onto the species and their development (Brown and Michael (2004) as is shown 
Figure 1. This can be contrasted with other examples of European legislation where such one-to-
one matching has been avoided 2. Our figure shows the boundary between human and animal can 
no longer be taken as a given, but is a contested regulatory space. Xenotransplantation  1  is an 
example of movement between regulatory spaces, but we argue, if in the UK regulation and species 
development coincide, is not necessarily within the appropriate regulatory institution of the APC. 
The remit of the APC relates to the welfare of animals and not humans. According to the same 
criteria, cybrids  4  are in a regulatory space that, in our view, does not neatly fit within the roles 
and responsibilities of the HFEA. 
 
 
                                                 
2  In 1999, the Council of Europe Working Group did a State of the Art Report and a survey of states which 
demonstrated that 20% of survey respondents allowed xenotransplant procedures without any legislative authorisation or 
restriction and that  48% were conducting xenotransplant research, many of them doing so under their animal protection 
laws (McLean & Williamson, 2005). 
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Regulatory institutions mapped on to formed and unformed human and animal bodies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1  Xenotransplanted person (whole person with animal organ). 2  GM animal (whole animal 
with human genes).  3  Human chimera embryo (human embryo with animal cells).  4  True 
hybrid embryo (50:50 DNA from different animal species).  5  Cybrid (complete human DNA 
in an enucleated animal egg).   
 
 
 
Hence, in the case of admixed embryos, regulators in the UK appear to have implicitly accepted 
the structural ‘fit’ between regulatory body and biological body, but chose to (uncritically) 
redefine the entity rather than the regulatory body. The cybrid has been categorised in 
reductionist terms based on the percentage of human DNA. Not only does this subvert notions of 
human and animal dignity (whatever that term means) it contravenes the principles for the 
existence of the HFEA that rested upon the special status of the embryo. Our solution based on 
this discussion is to point to the history and experience of previous committees such as 
UKXIRA, whose primary objective was to ensure that animal to human transplantation was 
developed both in ethical and safety terms (McLean and Williamson 2005, 98). The transference 
 
Formed Human Body 
Human Foetus 
Human Embryo 
Formed Animal Body 
Animal Embryo 
1 
2 
3 
4 5 
HTA 
Home Office (APC) 
UKXIRA 
HFEA 
 
Development 
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of animal-human material at the cellular or embryonic level would have meant an expansion, a 
change of emphasis but not a change of direction. Hence, UKXIRA (or a similar organisation) 
could be reconvened and given a permanent standing committee (as was originally intended) 
with a remit that would include all animal-human fusions. Insomuch as this would bring 
equilibrium back to the ‘regulatory’ and ‘organic’ body balance, as shown in Figure 1, it would 
also avoid real or perceived, transgressions between what is considered animal and what is 
considered human given the rapid, and often unpredictable pace of change in this area. To all 
intents and purposes, experience, independence, public consultation and open governance are 
required in an area that has the potential to bring back the mythological creatures of the past.  
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